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A theology which asks the question "What is the meaning
of revelation ?" is peculiarly a child of modern times. Theologians and school children alike knew the answer throughout
most of Christian history in terms of a simple distinction
between natural or rational and revealed knowledge, the
former a function of the unaided human mind, the latter
direct communication from God Himself. To be sure, theologians of the Middle Ages might encourage a questioner to
approach God from either direction, but from the thirteenth
century onward, there was often an insistence upon a separation of the two ways of knowing. St. Thomas Aquinas and his
followers all made the distinction. Even the breakup following
the Middle Ages did not notably disturb its terms even while
shifting its balance of emphasis.
To the majority of seventeenth and eighteenth century
rationalists, supernatural revelation, if indeed there was such,
was a concession to weaker minds, and concerned truths open
to an unaided reason whose exercise was sufficiently sustained.
Spinoza, for example, allotted to reason the whole field of
truth. He would allow revelation to define dogmas of faith
but only insofar as they were prerequisites to obedience and
piety. I t was reason's task to determine precise doctrine.
The reformers, on the other hand, peering through an
Augustinian conception of human depravity, saw little or no
reliable knowledge of things divine issuing from so damaged an
instrument as reason. True, Calvin inconsistently granted to
reason the power to discover "innumerable proofs" for God's
existence from the world of nature, but Luther contemplated
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human reason only with contempt. Their spiritual progeny
hastily reverted to a viewpoint allowing greater room to
reason, however. Melanchthon's position was virtually that of
the scholastics.
The natural or rational theology of the late Middle Ages
was little heard of outside of Roman Catholicism by the nineteenth century. But during that century this also meant
that the concern for revelation which St. Thomas conceived
of as a supplement to reason also virtually disappeared. Kant,
for example, makes little reference to revelation, and the great
Schleiermacher almost confines the conception to a single
postscript.
Schleiermacher's emphasis on a religious self-consciousness
seems to preclude the idea of a revelation which could provide
cognitive knowledge. To him revelation had to do with a
state of feeling rather than cognition. Not many were willing
to follow him thus far, but he did in a way express the intellectual climate of much of the nineteenth century. Lessing,
Jacobi, and Hegel all held positions consonant with that of
Schleiermacher. Ritschl saw theological knowledge as resting
on "value judgments of faith" rather than upon theoretical
knowledge of God as preliminary to faith. "We know the
nature of God and Christ only in their value for us." Certainly
there was no place in his system for revelation conceived as
doctrine communicated with authority.
Biblical criticism had made the concept of verbal inspiration
so untenable to many nineteenth-century scholars that they
were forced to conclude that only by abandoning the term
revelation itself could they effectively retreat from so vulnerable a position. This retreat provides the historical antecedents for much of contemporary thinking on the subject.
I t shall be the acknowledged purpose of this article to
consider in somewhat general terms the essential features
of the current discussion. An attempt will also be made to
assay its significance to Christian faith. I t will not be
even to resemble in so brief a ,tr&ment adequate coverage
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of the variant viewpoints available to us. But since they are
in somewhat general agreement in what they deny if not
in what they affirm, it seems worthwhile to assess their
agreement and what it implies.

Traditionally, revelation has meant an unveiling of something formerly hidden. Now there is a sense, of course, in
which all knowledge may be regarded as revealed. The knowing mind observes, selects, and interprets. But it must do so
from that which is presented to it, and therefore must be
active as well as passive in the knowing act. I apprehend
correctly only when my apprehension agrees with that which is
apprehended. However, some theologians anxious to maintain
a clear distinction between what they have called divine
revelation and rational knowledge have spoken as if revelation
alone is something given to us and as if the knowledge available to reason is largely the creation of the knowing mind.
I t might seem obvious that no act of perceiving can be
explained solely from the side of the knowing subject, regardless of what kinds of objects enter into the knowing experience.
If it is to be knowledge about something and not merely
imagination or false opinion, something must, a t least in one
sense, be presented to the knower. But the question that
concerns us here is whether this is all we indicate by the term
revelation; whether revealed knowledge differs only in the
kind of information made available.
For many present day thinkers, Biblical revelation seems
to differ from the more casual knowing process by always
taking place between persons. In other words, revelation is
not of an object to a subject but from mind to mind, from
subject to subject. There is a further distinction to be noted.
In Biblical revelation, it is revelation of the Divine Mind to
the human mind, and not merely of one human mind to another. According to this distinction, when we reveal ourselves
to others, we do so for the most part in terms of knowledge
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about ourselves rather than knowledge of ourselves. God, on
the other hand, discloses only Himself rather than a body of
information concerning certain things about which we might
otherwise be ignorant. In short, divine revelation has not to
do with information about God, but the very God Himself.
Kittel notes that both in the New Testament and in the
Old, revelation is neither the communication of supernatural
knowledge nor the stimulation of numinous feeling, though
both of these may accompany the revelation. "His offering
is Himself in fellowship."
I t should not be necessary to observe that this is far from
the church's classical understanding of revelation. The Christian Church very early began to equate divine revelation
with a body of information which God communicated to men.
Its stubborn defense of the position was partially due to its
apologetic needs during those troubled years, and partially
because it buttressed threatened ecclesiastical authority
with a necessary unity of doctrine.
Revelation thus formulated characterized later Judaism
and Christianity in both its Roman and Protestant branches
with minor exceptions until the modern period. The words
of the Bible were conceived as the i$sissima verba of God, a
view still more or less prevailing in much of Roman Catholicism and in certain so-called fundamentalist branches of
Protestantism.
Elsewhere in Christendom revelation has come to be
considered in quite other terms. Let us note some prominent
examples: Wilhelm Herrmann of Marburg said, "God is the
content of revelation. All revelation is the self-revelation of
God." Karl Barth's "Word of God" which may be spoken
to man as he reads the words of the Bible but is not itself
the words of the Bible is also typical.2 William Temple once
Wilhelm Herrrnann, Der Begrig der Ogenbarung (1887); reprinted
in O@abarung und Wunder (Giessen, 1go8), pp. g ff.
Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics,-UJ, I , part 2 (New Y o r k 1 9 5 ~ ) '
PP. 473 ff.
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said, "What is offered to man's apprehension in any specific
revelation is not truth concerning God but the living God
Himself." (It is interesting that almost all of these men
claim this to be the conception of the Bible writers themselves.)
Says John Baillie,
[When we] consider the Biblical view of revelation, it is abundantly clear that what is here regarded as revealed is a way of deliverance
from an ultimate human exigency, a way of salvation . . . it is not
primarily the knowledge of salvation that is spoken of as revealed
but the salvation itself. . . The Bible does indeed speak of saving
knowledge, but this is no mere knowledge that, and no mere knowledge about; it is knowledge of. I t is what our epistemologists call
knowledge by acquaintance as distinct from merely conceptual
knowledge. God does not give us information by communication.
He gives us Himself in communion.*

This God who gives Himself in communion rather than in
propositions is revealed as Being-in-action, invading the
field of human experience. The Bible is the story of God's
acts, the record of what He has done. Emil Brunner says
that "revelation is not a book or a doctrine; the revelation
is God Himself in His self-manifestation within history. Revelation is something that happens . . ." Rudolf Bultmann
writes, to reveal ". . . does not designate a doctrine which
enlightens but an action of God, that is, an event. . ."
Such events may also point to future events and thus fuller
revelation.

All this represents a departure from classical thinking on the
subject. To our older theologians, God's action in history was
seen as only "among other things" concerning which we are
informed in the Scriptures. Well-known is the division by
St. Thomas Aquinas of revelation into information concerning
William Temple, Nature, Man and God (London, 1953), p. 322.
John Baillie, The Idea of Revelation (New York, 1956), pp. 46, 47.
Emil Brunner, Revelation and Reason (London, 1947)~p. 8.
Rudolf Bultmann, Der Begrig der Ogenbarung im Neuen Testawent (Tiibingen, 1929), p. 22, note 5.
8
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God's nature, His works, and the events to be expected at
the end of earthly history.
Most of the writers to whom we have referred agree that the
revelation of God in history is by no means simple. Involved
are both God's activity and the interpretation of that activity.
I t does not necessarily follow that those who experience the
events find in them God's revelation. The divine self-disclosure
has as its necessary pre-condition the illumination of the
receiving mind. Thus the words of Brunner, "The fact of the
illumination is therefore an integral part of the process of
revelation . . . Jesus Christ is not 'revelation' if He is not
recognized by anyone as the Christ." History, according
to C. H. Dodd, is "not merely occurrences but events which
are occurrences plus meaning. He notes further that some
of these events are such "that the meaning of what happened
is of greater importance historically speaking than what
happened." In much contemporary theology it is this
capacity for seeing meaning in history that constitutes inspiration.
God's acts in history are accomplished through human
agencies and thus are not only divine actions but a t every
point also the actions of men even though God may be their
intiator. I t is in meaningful response to God's action that man
takes part in the revelatory encounter, and it is only because
of this meaning-involvement that man is able to see God in
history. Wheeler Robinson in his Redemfition and Revelatiofl
says the prophets
"

.

. . find in the migration of Bedouin tribes from Egypt the
evidence of the redeeming activity of God. And they find in the
deportation of the Israelites to Babylon the not-less-clear evidence
of punitive activity of God vindicating His moral order. The events
themselves are, of course, capable of other explanations. But this
was theirs. And their explanation became a new event of far-reaching
consequence for the subsequent h i ~ t o r y . ~
Emil Brunner, op. cit., p. 33.

'C.H.Dodd, Histovy and the Gospel (New York, 1938)' pp. 104

Wheeler Robinson, Redemption and Revelatia (London, 1942).

pp. 182 ff.
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History thus was not merely history but Heilsgeschichte, and
the events clothed with meanings provided a living relation
in history with the God who is beyond history.
Many of these writers see all of history as in some way the
medium of revelation. Some (e.g., William Temple) see unusual
interventions on God's part as providing an exceptional
revelatory quality. Others (e.g., Paul Tillich) say that "there
is no reality, thing, or event which cannot become the bearer"1°
of revelation providing it enters into "revelatory constellations." Tillich speaks of persons as having the greatest possibility for revelatory significance.
Revelation as divine-human interpersonal encounter is
bound to reject any simple and direct identification of the
Christian revelation with the contents of the Bible. The
Bible becomes rather the written witness to such a relation.
Nor does it necessarily deny that the Holy Spirit was operative
in the recording of that witness. Baillie suggests, for example,
that "the same Holy Spirit who enlightened them unto their
own salvation must have aided their efforts." l1 The question
would seem to be, Aided them how much and in what fashion ?
The Roman Church, at least in the past, and the prevailing
view in traditional Protestantism was that the aid was plenary,
that is, to the point of inerrancy. The Roman Church could,
of course, project plenary inspiration from the Bible on into
the Church, in a manner denied Protestants.
Is the Bible equally everywhere the witness to divinehuman interaction, and thus to revelation? I t is held by
some that various portions of the Bible must be judged
according to the measure of their transparency to the living
God. There may be many things in the Bible possessing little
revelatory quality although it might seem artificial and unProfitable to list them since the referred-to transparency may
differ from individual to individual.
None of the Scriptures will be the vehicle of revelation to
lo

l1

Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (Chicago, 1951)) pp.
John Baillie, o p . cit., p. III.

118 ff.
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persons who are unable to hear God speaking through them.
Such might read the Bible from cover to cover without ever
encountering God's word. The Bible, indeed, supports this
contention in such passages as, Spiritual things "are spiritually
discerned"12 and that the "preaching of the cross is to them
that perish f~olishness,"~~
"none of the wicked shall understand; but the wise shall understand,"14 and Jesus' reference
to those who had eyes and ears, yet could neither see nor
hear. l5 It must surely always be the duty of the Bible student
to ask himself concerning any perplexing passage whether
the defect may not be in himself rather than in the text.

Granted that the conception of revelation discussed in the
preceding paragraphs represents an important departure
from the traditional views of the historical church, it remains
to be asked whether it can justly claim to be that of the Bible.
That the view is not wholly inconsonant with the Biblical
record seems fairly evident. The centrality of God in Christ in
the Bible is noted by Jesus Himself. Said He, "They are they
which testify of me." l6 The sermon a t Nazareth and His
conversation with the two disciples on the road to Emmaus
all resolutely attest to this truth.
Revelation is indeed an encounter with the living God Himself. But, we make bold to ask, can this crucial emphasis
upon the centrality of God in the revelation be maintained
in the absence of certain propositions about God? IS it
not possible that a too-radical denial of the propositional
content of revelation runs the risk of negating the entire
enterprise ?
One example of the implications of such a position can be
Cor 2 : 14.
Cor I : 18.
l4 Dan 12 : 10.
l6 Mk 8 : 18.
l6 Jn 5 : 39.
l2 I

lS I
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found in contemporary ethics. I t is precisely this viewpoint
which has given rise to contextual relativism in ethics, an
ethical stance that leaves the seeker for moral guidance little
comfort in the face of tragic moral decision save divine forgiveness. Paul Lehmann, one of its key exponents, writes,
"The fact is that propositional revelation and juridical expositions of a divine will are as obsolescent in Protestant
theology as thorough-going anthropological relativism is in
social ethics." 17 Contextualist ethics constitutes a radical
denial of the possibility of discovering precise, enduring and
dependable answers to the question of what it is that I as
a Christian am supposed to do in the world. It escapes the
ethical nihilism of a thorough-going relativity only by insisting
on the context of the church as its proper field of operation-a
context, by the way, notoriously difficult to define. This
position, underplaying as it does the continuities in the human
predicament and purposes of God, seemingly fails to provide
even the minimal moral guidance which every Christian has
a right to seek from his faith.
The emphasis we are considering appears to be largely one
of reaction against the sterile propositionalism of past Roman
Catholic and Protestant views of revelationviews which
were more often quests for authority and the buttressing of
church apologetics than a seeking for the mind of God. As in
most theologies of reaction, may it not be that its rejection
of propositional revelation is also an extreme, undercutting
viability in another direction? May it not be the case that
while the person-to-person encounter with the living God
constitutes the heart of the revelatory experience, such an
encounter depends more than might be obvious upon propositions both for its communication and its confirmation?
1s it ever possible to know God by acquaintance, apart from
supporting constellations of propositions about Him? Moreover, pray tell, how does one proceed to introduce Him to
l7

Paul Lehmann, Ethics in a Christian Context (New York, 1963),

P. 248; see also n.

I.
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individuals in ignorance without a t least a minimal medium
of symbolic or analogic conceptual formulae ? Surely these
constitute the bulk of what is meant by propositions about
God.
Knowledge by acquaintance would seem to presuppose
a t every step knowing the that and the about even though the
of finally transcends such knowledge in relative significance.
The vertical dimension, to use Barth's well-known figure,
presupposes the horizontal it transects. Would it ever be
possible to check illusion and delusion without the logical
tests of coherence and meaning provided only within the
realm of propositional knowledge? As one young man once
expressed his wrestling with the concept of God, "I am never
quite sure whether I am merely shadow-boxing with halfforgotten memories of my old man." How does one test truth
and distinguish it from its competitors apart from information
belonging to the public domain ? And finally, can an ethical
response to a revelation devoid of propositional context survive as a force in a world of men half uprooted from their
fathersJ concrete convictions regarding moral excellence ?
There is no doubt justification for a protest that the description of revelation to which the above comments are
directed is a selective caricature rather than the total view of
very many responsible modern thinkers. This we freely admit,
however noting that the function of caricature is to throw
into bold relief sub-surface tendencies not casually apparent.
What we intend is to draw attention to what we insist is a
hazardous tendency in contemporary theology. We take some
comfort from the evidence that others have also sensed the
peril. Surely this is the warning note sounded by the new
quest for the historical Jesus as well as some current wistful
glances at the Ten Commandments.
Lionel Thomton once wrote,
The Biblical writen wove the garments in which theophany is
clothed apart from which it cannot be manifested, for without that
external medium of presentation the revelation would simply
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disappear from our ken. As surely as in a modern scientific romance
"the invisible man" was no longer seen when he took off his clothes.18

May we submit that the invisible word was beheld only by
becoming clothed in flesh. To this, Biblical faith bears ever
abundant witness. To dismiss the that and the a b o ~ in
t revelation is to run the tragic risk of losing the of as well.
18 Lionel

Thornton, Revelation in the Modern World (London,

I 9.50)~P. 130-

